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Our interests are in positive and normative analysis of oligopolistic housing markets with negative 
externalities and monopolistically competitive markets with product differentiation. We study private housing 
supply depending on public housing construction with the combination of the 'bid rent function approach" and 
with the “strategic approach." We also consider stability and instability of equilibria of monopolistic 
competition and examine whether these equilibria behave as we predict. 
In Chapter 2, we investigate how a public housing consruction affects private housing supplies based on a 
model which incorporates negative neighborhood externalities into housing markets. An additional 
construction of public housing has an effect on willingness to pay for private housing supply. The number of 
private housing supplies may decrease or increase depending on the distance from the residential block where 
public housings are constructed : Private housing increases by the “pump-priming effect" and decreases by the 
“crowding-out effect" on the residential block in the number of public housing. We measure social welfare by 
the sum of residents' utility levels, and the social welfare level always increases on the residential block. Those 
of neighborhood may decrease or increase, and that of the whole city always increase when public housings are 
constructed. 
In Chapter 3, we study stability and instability of short-run and long-run equilibria of monopolistic 
competition with product differentiation. Since monopolistic competition is not either a game of complete 
information or of incomplete information, there should exist dynamic adjustment process of process in markets 
given the set of incumbent firms. Moreover, entry and exit of firms occur depending on the levels of individual 
profits. In the economies under investigation, the price index and total income level of consumers determine 
whether the differentiated commodities are substitutes or complements. We show that there may exist multiple 
short-run equilibria including stable and unstable ones. The cause is characterized by decreasing marginal cost 
and endogenous complementarities between differentiated commodities. 
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In Chapter 4, we use laboratory methods to explore the predictions of the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model on 
monopolistic competition. One round of the experiment takes three steps : subjects choose whether to enter the 
market as firms by paying fixed cost, the firms produce outputs subject to the market demand condition, and the 
firms and the consumers trade in double auction. We find that the number of firms and price index exceed the 
levels predicted by theory. Firms tend to stay in the market even when their profits are negative. They raise 
the prices to offset the deficit and the welfare levels are remarkably lower than those predicted by theory. 
論文審査の結果の要旨


















第三論文“ExperimentalMonopolistic Competition : The Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz Model" は、前章の理論分析結果
を踏まえたうえで、独占的競争産業の規模が変動する過程を実験により検証したものである。ここでは、企業の参入・
退出を含め、商品生産のための労働市場と商品取引のための実物市場をコンビュータプログラムによる仮想、のネット
上ダブ、ルオークションで設定し、この市場を通じて得られた均衡値を理論値と比較検討した。結果として、実験市場
を通じて得られた各商品の価格及び企業数は、理論値を大きく上回るものであり、さらに赤字企業が市場から退出せ
ず、黒字を求めて生産し続けるという傾向が観察された。これに応じ市場全体の社会厚生も理論値を大幅に下回る結
果となっている。
第一論文については公営住宅の財源である税金を徴収する制度の考察、第二論文については企業競争における補完
関係の基礎付けの考察、第三論文についてはさらなる実験による検証が課題として残されているが、審査委員会は一
致して提出された論文は博士(国際公共政策)の学位を授与するに値すると認定した。
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